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NOTES
EXPRESS NO-STRIKE CLAUSES AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE
WAIVER: A SHORT ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Express no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements have
been the subject of conflicting interpretation. One group of circuits has
limited the scope of these clauses in actions for damages and in actions
charging unfair labor practices. These courts have held that express no-
strike clauses cover only arbitrable disputes despite contract language
that seems more extensive. This limitation of the scope of no-strike
clauses is known as "coterminous interpretation." 1 Another group of
circuits has interpreted no-strike clauses as broadly as the contract lan-
guage provides, holding that these clauses can govern nonarbitrable as
well as arbitrable disputes.2 This Note concludes that a court should
employ coterminous interpretation in nonarbitrable disputes unless it
finds clear and unmistakable evidence of a waiver of the right to strike.
The Note first examines two contexts in which the Supreme Court
has concluded that the obligation not to strike is coterminous with the
arbitration provisions: the determination of the scope of implied no-
strike clauses and the determination of the availability of injunctive re-
lief. The Note then examines the scope of express no-strike clauses in
cases where the employer has sought damages instead of injunctive re-
lief. Next, it argues that a court should find clear and unmistakable
evidence of a waiver of the right to strike before interpreting an express
no-strike clause broadly. Finally, the Note applies the "clear and unmis-
takable" standard in reviewing previous circuit court decisions.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COTERMINOUS INTERPRETATION
A. The Scope of Implied No-Strike Clauses
An examination of the use of coterminous interpretation in cases
involving implied no-strike clauses provides a useful base for considering
the proper scope of express no-strike clauses. In Local 174, Teamsters v.
See infra text accompanying notes 24-36; see a/ro Note, Coterminous Interpretation: Limit-
ing the Express No-Strike Clause, 67 VA. L. REV. 729 (1981) (tracing the development of cotermi-
nous interpretation).
2 See inJa text accompanying notes 46-56.
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Lucas Flour Co.,3 the Supreme Court found an implied no-strike clause in
a collective bargaining agreement 4 containing terminal arbitration pro-
cedures5 but no express no-strike clause.6 In Lucas Flour, the union called
a strike to protest an allegedly unlawful employee dismissal, even
though the legality of the dismissal was subject to mandatory arbitra-
tion procedures. The company sued the union for breaching the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 7 In affirming the lower court's award of
damages, 8 the Supreme Court held that the mandatory, terminal arbi-
tration procedures imposed a duty upon both parties to arbitrate. The
arbitration clause therefore created an implied no-strike clause.9 The
Court emphasized that its decision was "not [meant] to suggest that a
no-strike agreement is to be implied beyond the area . . .covered by
compulsory terminal arbitration."' 0 Thus, the Court found the scope of
the implied clause to be coterminous with that of the arbitration
provision. " I
B. The Use of Coterminous Interpretation to Grant Injunctive
Relief
The Supreme Court has also applied coterminous interpretation to
3 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
4 Id. at 105.
5 The agreement provided that "any difference as to the true interpretation of this
agreement. . shall be submitted to a Board of Arbitration," and "[s]hould any difference
arise between the employer and the employee, [the] same shall be submitted to arbitration by
both parties." Id. at 96.
6 The union argued that "there could be no violation [of the agreement] in the absence
of a no-strike clause. . . explicitly covering the subject of the dispute." Id. at 104-05.
7 Id at 97.
8 Lucas Flour Co. v. Local 174, Teamsters, 57 Wash. 2d 95, 356 P.2d 1 (1960).
9 Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 105 ("[A] strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargain-
ing agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration con-
stitutes a violation of the agreement.") (footnote omitted).
The Court stated two reasons for finding an implied no-strike clause. First, it reasoned
that both parties must have intended to prohibit strikes over arbitrable disputes because they
agreed to the mandatory arbitration procedures. Id. Second, the Court believed that recog-
nizing an implied no-strike clause covering arbitrable disputes would promote the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes. Id. See also Note, supra note 1, at 731.
10 Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 106. This was the first time the Court had suggested that a
no-strike agreement, either express or implied, would cover only arbitrable disputes. See also
Note, supra note 1, at 730.
11 The Supreme Court followed the Lucas Flour decision in Gateway Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). In Gateway Coal, the union called a strike demanding the
company suspend two foremen who allegedly had forged information about the safety of the
air pressure in the mine shafts. Id. at 372. The company contended that the strike violated
an implied no-strike clause because the dispute was subject to the contractual arbitration
provisions. Accordingly, it sought an injunction to end the work stoppage. The Court im-
plied a no-strike clause into the agreement and expressly limited it to arbitrable disputes,
citing its prior decision in Lucas Flour. Id. at 381-82. Moreover, the Court expanded the
remedies available to enforce implied no-strike clauses by affirming the district court's injunc-
tion against the union. Id. at 381 n.14, 387-88.
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decide whether to enjoin a striking union from violating an express no-
strike clause. The fact that courts have granted injunctive relief only
against strikes concerning arbitrable disputes demonstrates a desire to
protect the right to strike.
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,12 the Supreme
Court affirmed a district court's decision to enjoin a striking union. This
was the Court's first authorization of injunctive relief after Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 13 In Boys Markets, the union struck to
protest work assignments the company had given to non-union person-
nel, contending that these jobs were reserved for union personnel.14 The
company contended that the strike violated the express no-strike clause
in the arbitration provision and sought an injunction.' 5 The Court held
that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
created an exception to the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act that
prohibit federal courts from granting injunctive relief in labor dis-
putes. 16 This section gives federal district courts jurisdiction over breach
of contract actions between labor organizations and employers.' 7 The
Court argued that unless federal courts are permitted to issue injunc-
tions, section 301(a) would enable striking unions to circumvent state
12 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
13 Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110,
113-115 (1982)).
14 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40.
15 The agreement provided that "there should be 'no cessation or stoppage of work,
lock-out, picketing or boycotts.'" Id. at 239 (quoting art. XIV, § D of the collective bargain-
ing agreement). In addition to the express no-strike clause, the collective bargaining agree-
ment required "'[a]ny and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement . . . arising
out of or . . . involving the interpretation or application of the terms of this Agreement
. . .' " to be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 238 n.3 (quoting art. XIV, § A of the collective
bargaining agreement).
16 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982), prohibits courts from
issuing injunctions against certain conduct in labor disputes. It provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute. . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any
of the following acts:
a. ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment
Id. § 104(a). Boys Markets overruled the Court's earlier decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). In Sinclair, the company and the union entered into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that provided for binding arbitration of disputes regarding wages,
hours, or working conditions. Id. at 197. The agreement also contained a no-strike clause
covering these arbitrable disputes. Despite this agreement, the union engaged in nine work
stoppages over a 19 month period. The company contended that each dispute was subject to
arbitration and sought an injunction. The Court, however, held that § 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act barred injunctive relief even when the dispute is arbitrable. Id at 203.
17 LMRA, § 3001(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), provides in part: "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization. . . may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
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court ability to issue injunctions. The unions would simply remove all
cases to federal court.18 The Court, however, expressly limited injunc-
tive relief to arbitrable disputes.19
The Supreme Court refined its position in Bufalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America 20 when it upheld the district court's refusal to en-
join the Steelworkers' sympathy strike, despite the existence of a broadly
worded express no-strike clause. 2' Although the legality of the sympa-
thy strike was subject to arbitration, the Court held that a sympathy
strike could be enjoined only if the underlying dispute was arbitrable. 22
Because the dispute underlying the strike at issue was between the com-
pany and a sister union and, therefore, not subject to the defendant
union's arbitration provisions, the Court agreed with the district court's
decision not to enjoin the sympathy strike.23 Although courts need not
apply coterminous interpretation in actions for damages caused by
breach of an express no-strike clause solely because of the Supreme
Court decisions, the Court's analysis in these cases suggests that cotermi-
nous interpretation is necessary to protect employees' right to strike.
II
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF EXPRESS NO-STRIKE CLAUSES
The circuit courts have developed two methods of defining the
scope of express no-strike clauses. Several circuits presume that express
no-strike clauses are coterminous with the collective bargaining agree-
ments arbitration provisions. These courts hold that such clauses extend
beyond the arbitration provisions only if explicit evidence supports a
waiver of the right to strike. Other circuits, however, interpret no-strike
clauses as broadly as the contract language provides unless the union
18 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 246.
19 Id at 254. The Court noted that an employer would not agree to an arbitration
provision in a collective bargaining agreement if that provision could not be specifically en-
forced. The Court also noted that the amount of damages caused by a strike may be hard to
calculate and, therefore, hard to recover. Furthermore, employers may hesitate to exacerbate
problems in their relationship with the union and, therefore, may not attempt to sue the
union after the strike is over. Id at 247-48 & n.17.
20 428 U.S. 397 (1976). In Bufalo Forge, the union struck in support of a sister union's
dispute with their employer. The company attempted to enjoin the strike, claiming it vio-
lated an express no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement. Id at 401. It did
not claim, however, that the dispute underlying the strike was subject to arbitration.
21 Id at 399 n.l. In a sympathy strike, there is no dispute between the employer and the
union. Instead, the union strikes in sympathy with a dispute elsewhere. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 582 F.2d 1346, 1348 n.2 (1978) (holding that work stoppages for
such reasons as political protests or intraunion disputes are sympathy strikes).
22 Bujfalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 407-11.
23 Strikes triggered by political events totally outside the control of the company are also
not enjoinable. SeeJacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n,
457 U.S. 702 (1982) (work stoppage by Longshoremen triggered by Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan and not by arbitrable dispute could not be enjoined).
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proves that the parties intended to limit the scope of an express no-strike
clause.
The Third Circuit, in Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Team-
sters Local Union 326,24 was the first court to extend coterminous interpre-
tation from implied to express no-strike clauses in a suit for damages. In
Delaware Coca-Cola, the union engaged in a sympathy strike25 even
though it had agreed to a broad, general no-strike clause in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.26 The employer sued to recover damages
caused by the strike, contending that the express no-strike clause alone
was enough to prohibit all work stoppages. In further support of its
position that the strike violated the collective bargaining agreement, the
company introduced two statements by union officials that allegedly
demonstrated that the union had intentionally waived the right to
strike.27 The first statement, by the union president, indicated that the
local union leaders "didn't care" 28 whether the strike violated the no-
strike clause.29 The second was a warning from a union shop steward
that the strike violated the no-strike provision.30 The company did not
introduce any evidence of the parties' intent during the negotiations re-
24 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980).
25 The union was certified as the bargaining representative for both the production and
maintenance (P & M) workers and the drivers. The P & M workers negotiated with the
company and came to an agreement. The drivers never came to an agreement and they
struck on several occasions. The P & M workers walked out in support of these strikes.
26 The no-strike clause provided in part:
"Section 1. The union will not cause nor will any member of the bargaining
unit take part in any strike, sit-down, stay-in, slow down in any operation of
the Company or any curtailment of work or restriction of service or interfer-
ence with the operation of the Company or any picketing or patrolling during
the term of this Agreement."
624 F.2d at 1183 (quoting art. XIV, § 1 of the collective bargaining agreement). The agree-
ment also included arbitration procedures. Id.
27 The company also introduced into evidence a telegram from the Eastern Conference
of Teamsters "stating that the sympathy strike violated the [P & M workers'] contract." The
court found this telegram unpersuasive as evidence of the company's claim that the union
had waived the right to engage in a sympathy strike because "[t]he Eastern Conference was
not involved in negotiating the 1976 contract." Id. at 1189-90.
28 Id. at 1189.
29 The general manager of the plant stated that when he told the union president that a
strike would constitute a breach of the P & M workers' contract, the president responded that
"he didn't care; that the time to strike the Coca-Cola plant was in the summertime, and he
wasn't going to wait until the issue was resolved." Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Gen-
eral Teamsters Local Union 326, 474 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Del. 1979). On appeal, however,
the Third Circuit took care to point out that the general manager testified that the union
president had actually stated "it didn't matter" whether the strike breached the P & M work-
ers' contract. Delaware Coca-Cola, 624 F.2d at 1189. The court argued that the entire ex-
change was ambiguous because it was not clear whether the president was talking about a
strike by the drivers, the production and maintenance workers, or both. Id
30 Delaware Coca-Cola, 624 F.2d at 1190. The court subsequently ruled that the steward's
statement was not evidence that the steward thought a sympathy strike would violate the
contract.
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garding the scope of the no-strike clause.3 1
The Third Circuit reasoned that normally an express no-strike
clause is the quid pro quo for arbitration procedures and should, there-
fore, be interpreted coterminously with these procedures in the absence
of explicit evidence establishing a more extensive waiver of the right to
strike.32 Thus, the court effectively created a presumption favoring co-
terminous interpretation.3 3 Furthermore, the court held that a general,
broadly worded express no-strike clause alone cannot establish this
waiver.34 The court found that the statements by the union officials
were ambiguous and, thus, did not constitute a waiver of the right to
strike.35 By applying the no-strike clause coterminously with the arbi-
tration provisions, the court found that the union had not violated the
contract and was not liable for damages.3 6
In Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB,37 the Third Circuit applied the ana-
lytical framework for coterminous interpretation developed in Delaware
Coca-Cola, but rejected the earlier holding that a broadly worded no-
strike clause could never by itself establish waiver of the right to strike.38
In Pacemaker, the employees struck when the independent insurance car-
rier refused to pay the claims of employee beneficiaries. The insurer's
refusal stemmed from the union's failure to pay its premiums and not
from any wrongdoing by the company. After notifying all employees
that the strike violated the collective bargaining agreement, the com-
pany dismissed the 126 employees who continued to strike. The com-
31 Id. at 1188.
32 Id. at 1186.
33 The court stated that:
Without evidence to the contrary, it is proper to presume that the no-strike
clause is not broader than the arbitration clause. Thus we feel that where the
sympathy strikers and their employer cannot arbitrate the subject matter of
the primary dispute, a generally worded no-strike clause does not bar the sym-
pathy strike.
Id. at 1187.
In NLRB v. Gould Inc., 638 F.2d 159 (10th Gir. 1980), cerl. deniedsub nom. Brown Boveri
Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 930 (1981), the Tenth Circuit also effectively adopted a pre-
sumption in favor of coterminous interpretation. The court found that the express no-strike
clause covered only arbitrable disputes because the company did not present extrinsic evi-
dence supporting waiver of the right to strike. The company was found guilty of unfair labor
practices for discharging employees who had engaged in a sympathy strike not covered by
arbitration.
34 Delaware Coca Cola, 624 F.2d at 1187.
35 Id. at 1189-90.
36 This is the only decision that applies coterminous interpretation to absolve a union
from liability for a breach of their no-strike clause. Although the Sixth Circuit applied coter-
minous interpretation to find that a union had not breached its no-strike agreement in Ryder
Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union No. 480, 705 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1983), this
decision was vacated and then reversed on rehearing en banc. Ryder Truck Lines v. Team-
sters Freight Local Union No. 480, 727 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1984).
37 663 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1981).
38 Id. at 459-60.
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pany contended that these employees had violated the no-strike clause
in their collective bargaining agreement. In response, the union filed
unfair labor practice grievances against the company, contending that
the no-strike clause did not apply to this strike.39 The administrative
law judge found that the union had waived its right to strike and dis-
missed the grievance. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Board
disagreed with the ALJ's finding of waiver and upheld the union's griev-
ance.40 The company appealed this decision.
The Pacemaker court agreed that coterminous interpretation was ap-
plicable to express no-strike clauses in the absence of explicit evidence
establishing waiver.4' However, it rejected the idea "that a general no-
strike clause may never waive the right to strike over unspecified, non-
arbitrable disputes."'42 This language suggests that an employer must
meet a less rigorous standard to establish a waiver of the right to strike,
but the court's decision did not depend on this relaxed standard. In-
stead the court focused on the structure of the collective bargaining
agreement. The agreement actually contained two no-strike clauses.
The arbitration section included one that covered only arbitrable dis-
putes.43 The other, independent of the arbitration section, was more
broadly worded than the first.44 According to the court, the presence of
these two clauses constituted sufficient evidence to establish a broad
waiver of the right to strike.45 Therefore, the court reasoned that the
39 The union alleged that the no-strike clause did not cover this strike and, therefore,
that the strike remained protected activity under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Pacemaker Yacht Co., 663 F.2d at 457. The union then argued that the company was guilty of
unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (1982). 663 F.2d
at 457.
40 Pacemaker Yacht Co., 663 F.2d at 457.
41 Id at 458.
42 Id. at 459-60. The court stated, "We believe there is no basis for limiting employees'
ability to waive the right to strike over nonarbitrable disputes simply because they were un-
foreseeable at the time the contract was negotiated." Id. at 460.
43 The narrowly worded no-strike clause provided: "'Should difference arise between
the Company and its employees. . . as to the interpretation or application of the provisions
of this Agreement, there shall be no suspension or stoppage of work and an earnest effort shall
be made to settle such differences immediately or in the manner described below.' " Id at 458
(quoting art. IX, § 9.1 of the collective bargaining agreement) (subsequent clauses set forth
grievance procedures).
44 The broadly worded no-strike clause provided:
"10.1 So long as this Agreement is in effect, the Company agrees that there
shall be no lockouts and the Union agrees that there will be no strikes, picket-
ing, slow downs, deliberate curtailment of production, work stoppages of any
kind or other interruption of the Company's operations. In the event one or
more employees fail to abide by the provisions of this article, the Company
retains full right to take any disciplinary action it deems necessary, including
discharge."
Id. (quoting art. X, § 10.1 of the collective bargaining agreement).
45 Id. at 458-59.
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union had waived its right to strike and the employer was not guilty of
unfair labor practices for dismissing these employees.
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, in Iowa Beef Processors,
Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,46 favored a broad interpretation of ex-
press no-strike clauses. In Iowa Beef Processors, strikers from two of the
company's plants set up picket lines at a third plant that was not in-
volved in the strike. Virtually all of the workers at the third plant
honored the picket line even though the union had agreed to a broadly
worded express no-strike clause47 and to a supplemental clause that con-
tained language specifically waiving the union's right to honor picket
lines.48 Furthermore, a union vice-president had warned the employees
that the strike violated the contract.49 The company brought an action
to recover damages sustained because of the strike, contending that the
union had violated the no-strike clause. Following a jury trial, the dis-
trict court awarded the company breach of contract damages. 50
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the scope of an express no-
strike clause is "analytically distinct" from the scope of the arbitration
provisions. 5' Noting that the extent of the union's obligation not to
strike " 'depends on the intent of the contracting parties,' ",52 the court
held that the scope of the no-strike clause was as broad as the contract
language provided.5 3 Furthermore, the court indicated that it would
limit the scope of the clause only if the union presented some evidence
showing that the parties intended the clause to have a limited effect. 54
Because the union did not present any such evidence, the court held
that the union had waived its right to honor picket lines55 and awarded
the employer damages. 56
46 597 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
47 The no-strike clause provided: "'During the term of this Agreement there shall be no
strike, stoppage, deliberate withholding of production, or suspension of work on the part of
the union or its members.'" 597 F.2d at 1143-44 (quoting art. VI of the collective bargaining
agreement).
48 The supplement provided: " 'In the implementation of Article VI of the agreement
the following rules shall be binding on the parties. . . . (2) the Union shall promptly order
its members to resume their normal duties notwithstanding the existence of any picket line.'"
Id. at 1144 (quoting art. VI of the collective bargaining agreement).
49 Id at 1142.
50 Id at 1141.
51 Id. at 1145.
52 Id (quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974)).
53 Id. at 1144.
54 Id at 1144-45 (citing Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir.
1972)).
55 "[W]e agree with the district court's conclusion that the language of the bargaining
agreement barred sympathy strikes." Id. at 1144.
56 See also United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1983) (coterminous
interpretation not applicable when determining if broadly worded express no-strike clause
prohibited sympathy strike when union charged company with unfair labor practices for sus-
pending sympathy striker).
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The Seventh Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit's method of inter-
preting express no-strike clauses in W- Canteen Service V. NLRB 5 7 al-
though it suggested that it was following a method similar to the Third
Circuit's analysis. In Canteen, the company fired twelve employees for
honoring another union's picket line at the company's plant. It con-
tended that the strike violated the express no-strike clause in their collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 58 This agreement also contained a clause
allowing the employees to honor picket lines at the facilities of other
employers.5 9 During the contract negotiations, however, the company
rejected a union proposal to expand this picket line clause to permit
employees to honor picket lines at the employer's premises.60 After the
dismissals, the union filed unfair labor practice grievances against the
company, contending that the employees had not waived their right to
honor picket lines at the employer's premises.6 ' The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) found that the dismissals were unfair labor
practices and the company appealed.6 2
The Seventh Circuit's statement that coterminous interpretation is
"a rule of contract interpretation and the parties may by express lan-
guage indicate their intent to interpret the no-strike and arbitration
clauses differently" 63 suggested that it would use coterminous interpre-
tation in the absence of explicit evidence establishing a waiver of the
right to strike. Before considering any extrinsic evidence of a waiver,
however, the court held that the language of the no-strike clause was
"sufficiently clear to preclude sympathy strikes" at the employer's prem-
ises.r4 Furthermore, the court held that the scope of the no-strike clause
57 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979).
58 The collective bargaining agreement contained a no-strike clause requiring the par-
ties to submit all disputes not covered by the agreement to arbitration. It provided:
"The Company and the Union agree that there will be no strike or lockout
during the life of this Agreement so long as the Company and the Union
abide by the terms of this Agreement or submit to arbitration any differences
which may arise which are not covered by this Agreement."
I. at 740 (quoting art. XVIII of the collective bargaining agreement).
59 This clause, however, did not include the company's own facilities. It provided:
"Section 3. The Company will not, as a condition of continued employment,
require the employees to cross any picket line established on or in front of the
premises of any other company. The individual or concerted refusal to pass
such a picket line shall not constitute grounds for discipline, discharge, and is
not to be considered as violating any provision written or implied which pro-
hibits the Union from striking."
Id. (quoting art. VII, § 3 of the collective bargaining agreement).
60 Id. at 746 & n.11.
61 As in Pacemaker Yacht Co., 663 F.2d at 455, the union argued that the strike was pro-
tected activity under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), and, therefore, the dismissals
violated § 8(a)(1) of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). 606 F.2d at 739. See supra note
39.
62 606 F.2d at 743.
63 Id at 744.
64 Id. at 746.
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and the scope of the arbitration provisions must be determined sepa-
rately.65 This analysis indicates the court's intention to interpret express
no-strike clauses as broadly as the contract language provides unless the
union introduces evidence that the parties intended to limit the scope of
the clause. Thus, despite its language supporting coterminous interpre-
tation, the Seventh Circuit applied here the Eighth Circuit's analysis in
Iowa Beef Processors, interpreted the no-strike clause broadly, and held
that the company did not commit an unfair labor practice by discharg-
ing the strikers. 66
III
THE PROPER SCOPE OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES
A. Consideration of Labor Law Policies
When determining the proper scope of an express no-strike clause, a
court should go beyond ordinary rules of contract interpretation 67 and
consider the policies underlying the national labor laws.68 In cases re-
quiring interpretation of express no-strike clauses, these policies conflict.
Specifically, the policies of freedom of employee organization guaran-
teed by section 7 of NLRA69 and the right to strike guaranteed by sec-
65 Id. at 744.
66 Id. at 749. But see Amcar Div., ACF Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 561, 566 (8th Cir.
1981) (broad no-strike clause by itself insufficient to establish waiver, but may constitute
waiver when examined in light of facts surrounding agreement).
67 A court should not interpret an express no-strike clause as it would an ordinary con-
tract; collective bargaining agreements are instruments of self-government affecting the future
relationship between the parties rather than instruments like ordinary contracts designed to
obtain one specific objective. See Hendricks v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 696 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir.
1983) (injecting private contract law into process of enforcing labor/management agreements
not likely to effectuate policy objectives of Congress). See also Cox, Rtelections upon Labor Arbi-
tration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1492-93 (1959); Feller, A General Theog ofthe Collective Bargain-
ing Agreenent, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 790-91 (1973).
68 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme
Court held that the federal substantive law applicable in labor cases decided in federal courts
should be based on national labor policy, as reflected in federal labor laws. In Lincoln Mills,
the company and the union had a collective bargaining agreement containing grievance and
arbitration procedures. The union filed several grievances concerning work loads and work
assignments, but it was not satisfied with the results and requested arbitration. The company
refused to submit the disputes to the arbitrator. The union brought suit to compel arbitra-
tion. In deciding for the union, the Court held that the federal judiciary has the power to
apply federal substantive law in actions brought under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1982), and that they should fashion this law from the policies underlying federal labor law.
353 U.S. at 456.
69 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Congress enacted both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
NLRA to further the policy of freedom of organization by protecting employees' right to
strike. The policy statement of the NLRA, § 1, provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce. . . by protect-
ing the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
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tion 1370 collide with the policy favoring preservation of industrial peace
expressed in section 1 of the LMRA. 7 1 Advancement of these conflict-
ing policies seemingly requires different methods for interpreting express
no-strike clauses.
To advance the policies of protecting employees freedom to organ-
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Furthermore, § 7 of that Act provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Fi-
nally, the policy statement in the LMRA, § 1, indicates that Congress did not reject its con-
cern with preserving employees' freedom of organization. It provides: "It is the purpose and
policy of this chapter. . . to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with
labor organizations .... " 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
Congress felt that freedom of organization would foster more efficient communications
between employers and employees, and, therefore, "promote rational and responsible settle-
ment of labor disputes by peaceful means." C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 13
(2d ed. 1983). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978) ("[T]he right to organize is at the very core of the
purpose for which the NLRA was enacted."); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300, 317 (1965) ("The central purpose of [the NLRA] was to protect employee self-organiza-
tion. . . from disruptive interferences by employers."); Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of
St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963) ("Collective
bargaining, with the right to strike at its core, is the essence of the federal scheme."); Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) ("[T]he right of employees to organize for
mutual aid . . . is the principle of labor relations which the Board is to foster."); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1936) (employees have fundamental right to
organize and § 7 of NLRA is meant to safeguard this right).
Employers can be held liable for interfering with their employees' § 7 rights regardless of
whether they intended to do so. See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1964)
(employer breached employees' § 7 rights by discharging them for allegedly threatening to
blow up plant when threats were never actually made).
70 Section 13 of the NLRA explicitly preserves the right to strike. It provides: "Nothing
in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations
or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); see also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963) ("[T]he right to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike
when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which in great measure implements and
supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.") (footnote omitted); NLRB v.
Local Union No. 639, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1960) ("[Section]
13 is a command of Congress to the courts to resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an
interpretation of [unfair labor practice statutes] which safeguards the right to strike. .. 2).
71 Congress enacted the LMRA, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), because unions had matured into powerful economic forces
and were using this power to disrupt the national economy. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, LABOR LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 89-93 (8th ed. 1977). The policy statement of
the LMRA indicates that labor law policy now includes the preservation of industrial peace.
It provides: "It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers . . . and to
protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1982). Furthermore, § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), gives
federal courts jurisdiction over disputes between employers and labor organizations. See supra
note 17.
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ize and the right to strike, courts should use coterminous interpretation
of express no-strike clauses. By limiting the scope of no-strike clauses to
arbitrable disputes, coterminous interpretation allows employees to
strike over any nonarbitrable dispute.7 2 In contrast, to advance the pol-
icy of protecting industrial peace, courts should use a broad interpreta-
tion of no-strike clauses. The threat that courts may hold unions liable
for striking over a broad range of issues may deter unions from engaging
in some strikes. This fundamental conflict in labor law policies forces
courts to favor one policy or the other.
B. A Suggested Method for Interpreting Express No-Strike
Clauses
The right to strike is labor's most effective economic weapon, and
without economic power, labor's right to organize would have little
meaning. To protect labor's power, courts should be hesitant to find
that a union has bargained away the right to strike; courts should pre-
sume that express no-strike clauses and arbitration clauses are cotermi-
nous. An employer should be able to defeat this presumption only by
presenting clear and unmistakable evidence of a waiver of the right to
strike. Such evidence, combined with the policy of protecting industrial
peace, justifies a broader interpretation of a no-strike clause. In the ab-
sence of clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver, however, courts
should apply coterminous interpretation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the clear and unmistaka-
ble waiver standard affords vigorous protection to employees' right to
strike. The Supreme Court first applied this standard in Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 73 to decide whether a broadly worded express no-strike
clause prohibited a strike over an unfair labor practice. In Mastro Plas-
tics, the union struck to protest the company's discharge of an employee
who had openly supported the union's organizational efforts. The union
contended that the discharge was an unfair labor practice and that the
no-strike clause did not cover strikes protesting unfair labor practices. 74
72 Because coterminous interpretation allows a union to strike over nonarbitrable dis-
putes, a court's interpretation of the scope of arbitration provisions becomes important. In a
series of cases following the Lincoln Mils decision, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the Court
fashioned its second principle of federal substantive labor law, see supra note 68, when it de-
cided to construe arbitration provisions to include "all disputes concerning the terms of the
labor contract, unless the parties clearly negate such construction." R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 606 (1976). This ex-
pansive interpretation of arbitration procedures means that even with coterminous interpre-
tation of no-strike clauses, unions lose the right to strike over many disputes.
73 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
74 Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the right to engage in concerted activi-
ties. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); see sura note 69. It is, therefore, an unfair labor practice under
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The Court held that a union retains the right to strike over an unfair
labor practice in the absence of an explicit waiver of that right.75 The
Court acknowledged the paramount importance of the right and rea-
soned that it complements the policy of protecting industrial peace be-
cause effective negotiations depend on employees having " 'full freedom
of association.' "76
Although the Mastro Plastics Court dealt with the narrow issue of
whether to enjoin an unfair labor practice strike,77 its reasoning applies
to other contexts. The right to strike in support of other unions or in
protest of unsafe working conditions is also part of full and fair freedom
of association and is important in the negotiation process. Moreover,
the Court's recognition that a policy protecting the right to strike en-
hances the negotiation process supports the statutory protection already
given the right to strike by both section 778 and section 1379 of the
NLRA.8 0
The Court also has protected the right to strike by limiting the
availability to employers of injunctive relief against strikes.8 ' In Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 77082 for example, the Court
interpreted section 301(a) of the LMRA83 narrowly, forbidding federal
courts from enjoining striking unions unless the strike is over an arbitra-
ble dispute.84 In Bujizlo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,8 5 the
Court narrowed its interpretation of section 301 (a) even further, holding
that an injunction is permissible only if the dispute underlying the strike
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA for a company to discharge an employee for supporting a union. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
75 350 U.S. at 283 (waiver requires "compelling" expression); see also Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (applying clear and unmistakable evidence stan-
dard to waiver of union officers' right to be protected against more severe sanctions than those
accorded employees).
76 350 U.S. at 280 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151(b)).
77 The Alastro Plastics decision was based on serious unfair labor practices. The NLRB
held in Arlan's Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961), that a similar no-strike clause prohib-
ited a strike over a minor unfair labor practice. In applying the holding of Mastro Plastics, the
NLRB recognized a rule of reason approach: "[O]nly strikes in protest against serious unfair
labor practices should be held immune from general no strike clauses." 133 N.L.R.B. at 807.
Thus, the breadth of the Mastro Plastics decision has been narrowed further.
78 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); see supra note 69.
79 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); see supra note 70.
80 The statutory protection of the right to strike does not apply to all strikes. Unpro-
tected strikes include wildcat strikes, strikes with aggravated violence, repeated partial strikes
or work stoppages and strikes amounting to unfair labor practices by the union. See Gies,
Emplqyer Remedies for Work Stoppages that Violate No-Strike Provisions, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 178,
179-80 (1982).
81 See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
82 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
83 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982); see supra note 17.
84 398 U.S. at 253-54.
85 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
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is arbitrable. 86 Because a union engaging in a sympathy strike has no
arbitrable dispute with its employer, but is only supporting another
union's dispute, the Court effectively eliminated the possibility of en-
joining a sympathy strike. The protection of sympathy strikes from in-
junctions further illustrates the Court's eagerness to protect the right to
strike.
In light of the cogent policy and statutory support for the right to
strike, any waiver of this right must be supported by clear and unmis-
takable evidence. 87 A broad no-strike clause by itself does not indicate
conclusively that the union intended to waive the right to strike in all
situations.88 Nor does a union's failure to negotiate for a contractual
confirmation of its right to strike constitute a waiver.8 9 The right to
strike is too vital a part of the collective bargaining process to allow
ambiguous evidence to establish a waiver of the right.
Courts should investigate thoroughly the collective bargaining pro-
cess to determine whether the evidence establishes a waiver.90 The lan-
guage and structure of the agreement, previous company practices, and
evidence of the negotiation process provide courts with valuable assis-
tance in determining whether a union has actually waived its right to
strike. Without such an investigation, the natural desire of courts to
maintain industrial peace may lead to reliance on weak evidence to in-
terpret a no-strike clause broadly and thereby jeopardize the union's
right to strike.9 1
A requirement that courts find clear and unmistakable evidence of
a waiver of the right to strike before interpreting a no-strike clause
broadly will not deprive the employer of the true benefit of his bargain.
86 Id at 408-10. Supreme Court precedent applying coterminous interpretation to im-
plied no-strike clauses should not govern in an express no-strike clause context. When a no-
strike clause is implied by the existence of arbitration procedures, the clause is necessarily
coterminous with them. Such symmetry by definition is not present in express no-strike
clauses. See supra text accompanying notes 3-I1.
87 Cf United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1976) (waiver of statu-
tory right to have union representative present at employee grievance hearing must be clearly
and unmistakably established).
88 Courts should be wary of accepting broad no-strike clauses as conclusive evidence of a
waiver of the right to strike because collective bargaining agreements are not simply con-
tracts. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. E.g., NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d
162, 167 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978).
89 E.g., NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981); cf.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1963) (statutory right to
wage information did not have to be included in collective bargaining agreement).
90 This time consuming method of interpreting express no-strike clauses applies only to
actions for damages or to unfair labor practice grievances. In actions where the employer
seeks a temporary restraining order or an injunction, the time limitations prohibit an in depth
factual inquiry. The Supreme Court has decided, however, that coterminous interpretation
always applies to these cases. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
91 See infia notes 102-04 and accompanying text; supra notes 57-66 and accompanying
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An express no-strike clause is not necessarily the quid pro quo for arbi-
tration procedures; an employer may make concessions to obtain a no-
strike clause that extends beyond the agreement to arbitrate.92 If a
court always applied coterminous interpretation, employers could com-
plain that they were being deprived of the benefit of their bargain. The
existence of further employer concessions, however, will constitute suffi-
cient evidence of a waiver. The union's right to strike therefore remains
protected. The clear and unmistakable evidence standard thus satisfies
the expectations of both parties.
Finally, the clear and unmistakable evidence standard allows the
no-strike clause and arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement to remain analytically distinct.93 The no-strike clause and
the arbitration provisions will have the same scope only if the company
cannot produce evidence adequate to support waiver. Therefore, the
scope of the arbitration provisions does not automatically determine the
scope of the no-strike clause.
IV
APPLICATION OF CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE WAIVER
STANDARD TO RECENT CIRCUIT COURT
DECISIONS
This section applies the analytical framework developed in the pre-
vious section to recent circuit court decisions defining the scope of ex-
press no-strike clauses. Application of this framework yields the same
conclusion as the court reached in both Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
General Teamsters Local Union 32694 and Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters.9 5 Application of the framework to the facts of WY
Canteen Service v. NLRB,9 6 however, would lead to a conclusion different
from the court's and serves as an example of the enhanced protection
this method of analysis affords the right to strike.
In Delaware Coca-Cola,9 7 the extrinsic evidence supporting a broad
interpretation of a no-strike clause consisted only of statements by union
officials. One statement, by a regional officer, warned the local that the
strike violated the contract with the employer while a statement by a
local official indicated that the union would strike regardless of any vio-
92 See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976) (quid pro quo
for employer's promise to arbitrate was union's obligation not to strike over issues subject to
arbitration).
93 See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974) ("Absent an
explicit expression ... the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be...
coterminous. . . .") (emphasis added).
94 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980).
95 597 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
96 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979).
97 See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
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lation of the no-strike clause. Each statement merely represented the
individual speaker's views and did not necessarily mirror those of the
union. Consequently, neither statement provided clear and unmistaka-
ble evidence of waiver by the union of the right to strike. Because
neither party introduced any other evidence supporting waiver, the
Third Circuit correctly applied coterminous interpretation.
In Iowa Beef Processors,9 8 the contract language by itself established a
waiver of the right to strike under the clear and unmistakable waiver
theory. The collective bargaining agreement contained a broadly
worded no-strike clause and a supplemental clause that explicitly re-
quired union members "'to resume their normal duties notwithstanding
the existence of any picket line.' "99 Although the broad no-strike clause
by itself does not meet the clear and unmistakable standard, the supple-
ment explicitly restricts the union's right to honor picket lines.100 This
specific contractual waiver satisfies the clear and unmistakable evidence
test.10' Thus, when applied to these facts, the Iowa BeefProcessors court's
analysis and the clear and unmistakable waiver theory arrive at the
same conclusion.
When applied to the facts of W.1 Canteen,t02 the suggested frame-
work indicates that the employer was guilty of unfair labor practices, a
conclusion contrary to that reached by the court and more supportive of
the employees' right to strike. In Canteen, the extrinsic evidence support-
ing waiver consisted of a picket line clause allowing the employees to
honor picket lines at the facilities of other employers and a union pro-
posal, rejected by the company, to include the employer's premises in
the picket line clause. Neither factor is clear and unmistakable evidence
that the parties agreed to a broad waiver of the right to strike. Section 7
of the NLRAt0 3 guarantees employees the right to honor picket lines. A
union does not have to negotiate for a contractual confirmation of this
right. 104 Thus, the rejected union proposal does not clearly establish a
waiver of the right to strike. Furthermore, the presence of the picket line
clause, which expressly included the facilities of employers other than
98 See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
99 597 F.2d at 1144 (emphasis supplied by court) (quoting collective bargaining
agreement).
100 Id.; see supra notes 67 & 88 and accompanying text.
101 In Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1981), the court made a
similar finding. In Pacemaker, however, it was the structure of the agreement rather than the
language of the agreement that constituted an explicit waiver of the right to strike. See supra
notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
103 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); see supra note 69.
104 In NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981) the court
faced the question of whether the company's rejection of a union proposal to allow the union
to honor any official AFL-CIO picket line constituted explicit evidence of the union's waiver
of the right to strike. The court held that this evidence was insufficient to establish waiver.
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the contracting one, does not imply that the union waived the right to
honor picket lines at the contracting employer's premises. Thus it does
not establish a waiver of the right to strike. Otherwise, a union would
forfeit all unconfirmed statutory rights by successfully negotiating for a
contractual confirmation of some statutory rights. Because neither the
rejected picket line proposal nor the final restricted picket line clause
provides clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver, a court addressing
the W. Canteen facts should interpret the no-strike clause coterminously
with the arbitration provisions, thereby giving the employees' right to
strike greater protection.
CONCLUSION
Although created as a tool to define the scope of implied no-strike
clauses, coterminous interpretation is also valuable in defining the scope
of express no-strike clauses. Courts should presume that an express no-
strike clause is coterminous with the arbitration provisions in a collective
bargaining agreement. They should disregard this presumption only if
the employer clearly and unmistakably establishes that the union has
waived its right to strike. Although some circuit courts have adopted
this approach to interpreting express no-strike clauses, others have re-
jected it, presuming instead that express no-strike clauses are as broad as
the contract language provides. The latter framework does not ade-
quately protect the employee's right to strike in all cases and should be
abandoned in favor of the clear and unmistakable waiver standard.
Andrew M. Short
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